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23. And has also been recognised elsewhere: -Haynes v. Sledge,
2 Porter (Ala.) 536; State v. Ricketts, 74 N. C. 187. In New
Hampshire) a writ may be issued on Sunday if not done "to the
disturbance of others:" CJlough v. Sh7epherd, 11 Foster 490; and
it is clear that where'a statute confers authority to execute a writ
upon a given date, it necessarily implies a right to issue it at that
time: Rice v. Commonwealtk, 3 Bush 14; 4.aynes v. SZledge, 8upra.

Hence, in cases of irreparable damage, it is submitted that a
court possessing equitable jurisdiction, will not refuse to assert that
jurisdiction, solely by reason of the date upon..which absolute necessity has required the application to be made. This, of course, is
apart from any express legislation to the contrary.
ANGEL0 T. FREE LEY.
(To be continued.)
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BOX v. JUBB.
The defendants were the owners of a reservoir, which was supplied with water
from a main drain, not their property, which flowea by it. There were sluice gatea
properly constructed between the reservoir and main drain at both the inlet and out
let. Owing to an obstruction in the main drain at a point below the defendants'
reservoir, caused by a third party over whom the defendants had no control, and
without their knowledge, the water in the drain forced open the sluice gates and
caused the reservoir to overflow on to the plaintiff's land. Hedd, that the defendants were not liable for the damage caused by the overflow.

Tnis was a special case stated in an action tried in the County
Cout of Bradford, by consent of both parties, to recover damages
from the defendants caused by the overflowing of a reservoir belonging to them.
The following facts were admitted by both parties:
The defendants were the owners and occupiers of a cloth mill at
Batley, in Yorkshire, and for the necessary supply of water to their
mill there was a reservoir also belonging to them. The mill and
reservoir had been built and used as such, and in the same manner,
for many years.
The plaintiff was tenant of the premises adjoining the mill.
The reservoir was supplied with water frofin a main drain or
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watercourse which passed by the reservoir. There was an inlet
and also an outlet, at both of which there were proper doors or
sluices, so as (when required) to close the communications between
the reservoir and the main drain. The defendants had a right to
use the main drain for obtaining water for their reservoir, and also
for carrying off their surplus water, but had otherwise no control
over the main drain, which did not belong to them.
In December 1877 the plaintiff's premises were flooded by the
overflowing of the defendants' reservoir. The overflowing was
caused by the emptying of a large quantity of water from a reservoir, the property of a third person, into the main drain at a point
considerably above the defendants' premises, and by an obstruction
at a point in the main drain below the defendants' reservoir, whereby the water was forced back through the doors or sluices of the
reservoir (which were closed at the time), and caused the reservoir
to overflow on to the plaintiff's premises. The obstruction was
caused by circumstances over which the defendants had no control,
and without their knowledge, and had it not been for such obstruction the overflowing of the reservoir would not have happened.
The doors or sluices between the main drain and the reservoir were
constructed and maintained in a proper manner, so as to prevent
the overflowing of the reservoir under all ordinary circumstances,
and no negligence or wrongful act was attributable to either party.
The County Court judge decided that the defendants were liable,
and gave judgment in the plaintiff's favor for 751.
The question for the opinion of the court was whether the defendants were, under these circumstances, liable.
Gully, Q. C., for the appellants, distinguished this case from
Rylands v. Fletcher,Law Rep. 8 H. L. 330, on the ground that
in that case there were old workings on the land which it was the
duty of the defendant to protect; the defendant there also brought
a mischievous thing on to his land for his own purpose. The
defendants in this case did not construct the reservoir; and there
was vis major, namely, an act of a man over whom the defendants
had no control, which was primarily the cause of the damage which
ensued. The case is on all fours with .Nicholls v. Marsland, Law
Rep. 2 Ex. Div. 1.
Bray, for the respondent.-The case is within Bylands v.
Fletcher. The defendants are in possession of the reservoir and
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the communications between it and the drain, and tuough they
may not have been made by them, yet they are there for their purposes. If they have sluice-gates they must be made as strong as
the channel itself. The whole question turns on whether this was
occasioned by vis major; but nothing that can reasonably be
anticipated can be vis major. He also cited Oarstairsv. Taylor,
Law Rep. 6 Ex. 217; Fletcher v. Smith, Law Rep. 2 App. Cas.
781; Humphrie8 v. 0ou8ins, Law Rep. 2 0. P. D. 239; Bell v.
Twentyman, 1 Q. B. N. S. 766; 1o88 v. Sedden, Law Rep. 7

Q. B. 661.

KELLY, 0. B.-The defendant in this case, it appears, had been
in possession of this reservoir, and the communications between it
and the main drain, for a number of years; there was no defect in
their construction; moreover the case finds that the inlet and outlet were furnished with proper doors. The question is, "What was
the cause of the overflow; was it any thing for which the defendants are responsible; was there any act or default of theirs V"
Now it is found by the case that the obstruction was caused by
circumstances over which the defendant had no control, namely, by
the act of a third party. I care not whether it is called vis major
or a wrongful act of a third party. Then it is contended that the
defendants ought to have anticipated the possibility of such a vast
quantity of water pressing on their gates; but the case does not
find that any amount of strengthening in the gates could have
resisted the great pressure suddenly brought to bear on them. I
am of opinion, for these reasons, that the defendants are entitled to
our judgment.

POLLoCK, B.-This is a case deserving of great consideration,
and I should, perhaps, have liked further consideration of it if all
the authorities bearing on the subject had not been cited for the
plaintiff. What wrong has the defendant in this case done? If a
man builds his mill-dam of good materials, and constructs it pro.
perly, as was here the case, for what is he to be liable? Bylando
v. Fletcher, if read carefully, has no analogy to the present case ;
in that case the House of Lords, in the judgment of Lord Chancellor CAIRNS, adopted the accurate language of Mr. Justice BLACKBURN in the court below. This case bears no analogy to the case
of a common carrier, who is only excused by the act of God or the
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Queen's enemies. The case of 1o8s v. Fedden is, to a certain
extent, applicable, but I do not rest my judgment on that case.
Judgment for the appellants.
In America, the rule is well settled ples. But so far as it did, it has not
that if a mill-dam, properly built and7 been approved in this country. Swoett v.
kept in proper repair, breaks away, with- Cults, 50 N. H. 439 ; Brown v. Collins,
out any negligence of the owner, the lat- 53 Id. 442; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.
ter is not responsible to persons below, Y. 476. See Simonton v. Loring, 68 Me.
injured by the escape of water. Negli- 164.
On the other hand the case itself was
gence is the gist of liability : Liviniston
approved in Wilson v. New
apparently
v.
Hoffan
175;
Cow.
8
v. Adams,
Toulumne County Water Co., 10 Cal. Bedford, 108 Mass. 261. There the
413; Everett v. Hydraulic Co., 23 Id. city of New Bedford built a reservoir to
supply the city with water, on land sold
225; Lapham v. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371
them by the plaintiff, but water from
Shrewsbury t. Smith, 12 Cash. 177.
The degree of care required, of the their pond percolated through the soil
owner of the dam being of course in pro and damaged the cellar and 9sljacent
portion to the extent of the injury likely lands of the plaintiff. And the company
to result to others if the dam should give was held liable under a statutory process
way. It may not be enough that the dam for all damages so caused, and without
be capable of resisting the ordinary spring direct proof of negligence. See also
freshets, for if that ptirticular stream Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520. It was
is known to be occasionally subject to also followed in the very elaborate and
extraordinary freshets, these likewise carefully considered case of Cahill v.
must be guarded against: Mayor of New Eastman, 18 Minn. 324, where the deYork v. Bailey, 2 Denio 433, where the fendant had excavated a tunnel in his
dam across the Croton river gave way. own land extending under a stream, and
And this is so, although such extraor- the pressure of the water broke in the
dinary freshets occur only once in several tunnel, and the water rushing through
years and with no regular intervals be- injured the plaintiff's land adjoining the
tween : Gray v. Harris, 107 Mass. 493. defendants, and he was held liable, withConversely, too, the owner of a mill- out any other proof of negligence on his
dam is liable to the landowner above, part.
So if a person has a vault or privy
whose laud is overflowed by the pond,
only for such damage as may ordinarily on his own land near the line, and a
and naturally be expected, and not for neighbor's premises are injured by perdamage caused only by great and extraor- colations therefrom, he has a remedy
dinary floods, out of the ordinary course without any other proof of negligence
of nature. See Young v. Leedom, 67 than the bare fact of maintaining the
Penn. St. 351 ; Bell v. McClintockc, 9 nuisance in such a place: Ball v. Nye ,
Precisely similar is
Watts 119 ; 1f Coy v. Danley, 20 Penn. 99 Mass. 582.
Womersley v. Church, 17 Law T. Rep.
St. 89; China v. Southwickc, 12 Me.
238; Smith v. Agawam Canal Co., 2 190, a valuable case apparently not
Allen 358; Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh elsewhere reported.
So far as Harwood v. Benton, 32 Vt.
Coal 6- No. Co., 4 Rawle 9 ; Monon724, contains anything inconsistent with
gahela Nay. Co. v. Coon, 6 Barr 379.
It is doubtful whether the case of these principles, it may arise from not
Rylunds v. Fletcher intended to lay down distinguishing between injuries resulting
any rules inconsistent with these princi- from natural or artificial causes, and is

